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NOTE
NARROWLY RESTRICTING "CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED" CIVIL LIBERTIES:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF A FAMILY
MEMBER'S [UNDER] PROTECTED
FEDERAL PRIVACY RIGHTS IN THE
DISSEMINATION OF
POSTMORTEM IMAGES IN
MARSH V COUNTY OFSAN DIEGO.
MAHIRA SIDDIQUI*
"Nothing in constitutionallaw is more controversialthan
substantive due process.
INTRODUCTION
When tragedy befalls a family, and a loved one is lost, the beloved's
life should be commemorated with unforgettable, cherished images of
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Editor (2013-14), Golden Gate University Law Review. I dedicate this Note to my loving parents,
Anwer and Shaista, in recognition of their relentless wisdom, immeasurable tenacity, and
overwhelming conviction in my legal pursuits. I wish to thank my siblings and friends for
continuously encouraging, challenging, and inspiring me during this academic endeavor. I owe many
thanks to Ed Baskauskas, and to Tudor Jones and Alyce Foshee of the 2013-14 Editorial Board for
their keen eye, immense guidance, and steadfast support.
I Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REv. 63, 64
(2006).
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the individual's triumphant and revered character. 2 In the tender wake of
such a tragic loss, it becomes exceedingly difficult to maintain these
jovial memories when a vile postmortem photograph of the individual is
publicly disseminated. 3 These graphic pictures depict uncensored
information about the deceased family member, with the understandable
cognitive and emotive impact of such ghastly images.4 Naturally, a
sense of familial grief emerges from imagining the degree of suffering
the dearly departed endured. The dismay and shock are intensified when
the family is made aware of the multitude of spectators feasting on these
images to satiate their voyeuristic appetite through the ubiquitous
presence and viral nature of the Internet. 5 Recently, in Marsh v. County
of San Diego,6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 7
examined the federally protected right to privacy concerning the public
dissemination of a family member's death images and the power, or
lawful right, to prevent these images from being circulated.
Images can be more powerful and telling than mere words. 8 Such
appalling and gruesome images are destined to foment emotions-ones
tied to grief and memory-that represent the "intangible injury that a
constitutional right of familial privacy over images of death guards
against." 9 Relatedly, the fond familial memory of a child as the child
lived should not be unnecessarily besmirched by public access to
disturbing images of the child in death. For in the eyes of society, the
deceased child will be associated with cruelty and violence, without

2 Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012).

Id. at 1152.
4 Id.

s See generally Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 279-80 (1999) ("As a culture, we like to watch others and take
pleasure from the watching experience, even though we don't always like to admit to it. We rely on
the media to satisfy our craving for lurid and/or private [peeks] at others' lives and intimate
moments." (footnote omitted)).
6 See generally Marsh, 680 F.3d 1148.
History of the FederalJudiciary,FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts-coa-circuit_09.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
As the largest court of appeals in the nation with twenty-nine active judgeships and comprising a
fifth of the nation's states, the Ninth Circuit plays a vital role in correctly interpreting, and thus
molding, future precedent by broadly applying fundamental Supreme Court precedent, where
appropriate.
Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARv. L. REV.
683, 690 (2012).
9 Clay Calvert, A Familial Privacy Right over Death Images: Critiquing the InternetPropelled Emergence of a Nascent Constitutional Right that Preserves Happy Memories and
Emotions, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 475, 490 (2013).
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regard to the softheartedness and sheer innocence the child embodied in
life.
In Marsh, the Ninth Circuit held that a prosecutor who photocopied
and kept a child's autopsy photograph (and after retirement gave the
copy to the press) was entitled to qualified immunity.'o The court
reasoned that there was no "clearly established" law to inform the
prosecutor that his earlier conduct in making and keeping the photocopy
was unlawful." In so holding, the Ninth Circuit relied on American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,12 which held that a
plaintiff must prove that he or she was "deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States."' 3 Moreover, a plaintiff
must show that the federal right was "clearly established" at the time of
the violation; otherwise government officials are entitled to qualified
immunity.14
The Ninth Circuit should have adopted a broader approach in
finding a "clearly established" right to control a family member's death
images when addressing the prosecutorial misconduct at issue. After all,
the Marsh Court based its ruling on precedent that such a right is "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" as it relates to the privacy
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; thus, securing the right under
the Constitution as required by Sullivan.'5 Yet the court declined to go a
step further and hold the prosecutor accountable. By recognizing the
"deeply rooted" history and tradition of these privacy rights and applying
a broader standard to the instant case, the government official in Marsh
should not have been entitled to qualified immunity because the federal
privacy right was "clearly established" at the time of his unlawful
conduct. Instead the court should have focused on whether a reasonable
deputy prosecutor would have understood that keeping a photograph as a
personal memento (as opposed to him giving it to the press to vindicate
himself in the eyes of the public) violated Marsh's federal rights.16
The Ninth Circuit decided two issues in Marsh: (1) whether Brenda
Marsh, as a mother, had a constitutionally protected right to privacy over
her child's death images1 7 and (2) whether the right was a "clearly

0Marsh, 680

F.3d at 1160; see infra note 52 et seq. and accompanying text (discussing
qualified immunity doctrine).
I Id.
12Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
" Id. at 49.

14Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1160.
15Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154.
6
Id. at 1158-59.
17 Id. at 1152.
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established" law at the relevant time, sufficient to inform the prosecutor
that his conduct violated Marsh's right of privacy, thus stripping the
prosecutor of qualified immunity.' 8 This Note focuses on the latter
"clearly established" standard, calling into question the validity of the
prosecutor's qualified immunity status in Marsh.
Part I of this Note presents a background of the facts and procedural
history of Marsh v. County of San Diego and the relevant constitutional
law discussed in its holding, such as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of qualified immunity. Part II
further highlights the due process protections of the federally recognized
right to privacy under substantive due process and substantive state laws
protected by procedural due process. Part III argues that the Ninth
Circuit should have adopted a broader analytical approach of National
Archives & Records Administration v. Favish'9 regarding a "clearly
established" right to privacy over a family member's postmortem
images. Part IV discusses how the Marsh Court's narrow application of
a "clearly established" right to privacy in Favish compelled the court to
overlook the historical traditions of familial interests relating to death
images and prematurely grant a government official qualified immunity.
The Note concludes by emphasizing that a broader application of Favish
would have resulted in the denial of qualified immunity for the
prosecutor in Marsh.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MARSH V
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

On April 28, 1983, Brenda Marsh's two-year old son, Phillip Buell,
died from a severe head injury when he fell off the couch and hit his
head against the fireplace hearth. 2 0 At the time of the incident, Phillip
was in the care of his mother's then-boyfriend, Kenneth Marsh. 2 1
Kenneth Marsh was charged and convicted of second-degree murder. 2 2
Nearly two decades later, the San Diego County Superior Court granted
Kenneth Marsh's second habeas petition.23 The petition was granted
after the San Diego County District Attorney's consulted expert could
not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Phillip had been the victim

18 Id.
19 Nat'1
20

Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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of child abuse.24 As a result, Kenneth Marsh's conviction was set aside,
and he was released in 2004.25
Soon after his release, Kenneth Marsh sued the County of San
Diego and the medical personnel who conducted Phillip's autopsy.26
Marsh's attorneys deposed Jay S. Coulter, the San Diego County Deputy
District Attorney who prosecuted Marsh in 1983.27
During the
deposition, Coulter disclosed that he photocopied sixteen autopsy
photographs of Phillip's corpse while he was deputy district attorney.28
Coulter also mentioned that after he retired in 2000 he kept one of the
photographs as a "memento of cases that [he] handled." 29 Soon after
Marsh's release, Coulter sent a newspaper and television station a copy
of the photograph he had kept, along with a memorandum titled "What
Really Happened to Phillip Buell?" 3 0
Brenda Marsh sued Coulter and the County of San Diego under 42
U.S.C § 1983, ' alleging that the copying and dissemination of her late
son's autopsy photographs violated her Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights, 32 in particular, a federal right to control the autopsy
photographs of her child.
Defendants moved to dismiss the claims
relating to Coulter's conduct after he retired, which the district court

24Marsh, 680 F.3d at I152.
25
Id.
26 Id.

27Id.
28Id.
29 Id.

30Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152.

3142 U.S.C. § 1983 was first enacted as part ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972). The statute provides for equitable and legal remedies, including
damages, for a person whose constitutional rights have been violated by another person acting under
state authority. Prior to the enactment of § 1983, only equitable remedies, including injunctions by
the courts, historically remedied violations of constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant
part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2014) (emphasis added).
32Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012).
3 Id.
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granted. The parties then cross-moved for summary judgment, and the
district court granted the defendants' motion.34 Marsh appealed.
A.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 36

By directly addressing the states, Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment expands the protection of civil rights to all Americans. 37
The Due Process Clause guarantees any person "due process of law" and
limits states from passing arbitrary or unfair laws. 38 The clause also
establishes substantive and procedural requirements that state laws must
satisfy. These broad guarantees of rights form, together with the Bill of
Rights,39 the heart of civil liberties for American citizens.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that one aspect of
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause is "a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.'"40 This right
of privacy protects two types of interests: (1) informational control, that
is, "avoiding disclosure of personal matters," 4 1 and (2) familial integrity
and decisional autonomy, that is, "making independent choices and
decisions related to and affecting certain familial matters," 42 including
family relationship dynamics and child-rearing practices. 43

34 Id.
3s

Id.

36 U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
See Primary Documents in American History, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Nov. 18,
2013), http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/14thamendment.html.
38 Id.
U.S. CONST. amends. 1-X.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973)).
41 Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
42 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 798 (3d ed. 2006)
(observing that "the Court has expressly held that certain aspects of family autonomy are
fundamental rights," adding that these specific familial liberty rights include "the right to marry, the
right to custody of one's children, the right to keep the family together, and the right to control the
upbringing of one's children").
43 Carey, 431 U.S. at 684.
3

40
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The Justices have adopted two, often conflicting, approaches to
determine whether a case involves a fundamental right. The more
conservative Justices generally favor a historical approach for identifying
fundamental rights. 44 They acknowledge that a common-law right "rises
to the level of a substantive due process right if it is 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."' 4 5 The time-old phrase "deeply rooted" in American history
and traditions has been used with respect to fundamental rights relating
to the institution of family. 46 Conversely, in an effort to protect minority
interests, the more liberal Justices question whether a right is central to
"personal dignity and autonomy or is at the heart of liberty." 47
Therein lies a right to possession and disposition, and a "parent's
right to control a deceased child's remains and death images flows from
the well-established substantive due process right to family integrity." 4 8
A parent's right to choose how to care for a child's life reasonably
extends to decisions involving death. 49 Examples include whether to
have an autopsy, whether to have a memorial service, whether to publish
an obituary or photographs, and how to dispose of the remains.o
Naturally, a common-law right to privacy regarding the memory of a
deceased family member is ingrained in our nation's traditions and is
thus protected in our Constitution under substantive due process. 5'
B.

THE RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED FROM SUIT UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, a government official is
afforded protection from suit, not just a defense to liability.52 The
doctrine serves as a privilege not to stand trial or face the other
accompanying burdens of litigation.53 Thus, in the absence of a genuine
factual dispute affecting the applicability of immunity, a defendant

44Lee Goldman, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 601, 602 (2006).
45Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)) (emphasis added).
46 Id.

47 Goldman, supra note 44, at 602.
48 Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154 (emphasis added).
49 Id.

50

Id.

s1 Id.

52 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
5 Id.
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protected by qualified immunity is entitled to summary judgment.5 4
When applied correctly, qualified immunity serves to uphold a citizen's
constitutional rights, while vindicating the actions of a public official's
proper exercise of discretionary duties.55 In essence, the doctrine creates
a balance between providing private redress when government officials
abuse their authority and protecting responsible officials from civil
liability who diligently perform their duties.56
An official may enjoy this shield so long as his or her actions "[do]
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person should have known." 5 7 This standard protects
vulnerable public officials from the threat of frivolous litigation, which
would pose a substantial burden to society.5 8 Otherwise it would become
increasingly difficult to attract potential candidates for public positions,
and the risk of incurring liability would ultimately inhibit the zealous
Moreover, when reasonably
performance of current officials. 59
competent officials could disagree as to whether the conduct at issue
would violate "clearly established" rights, the immunity defense is
available.6 0 The main concern surrounding the immunity inquiry is
acknowledging "[r]easonable mistakes can be made as to the legal
constraints on particular police conduct." 6 1 Thus, qualified immunity
protects all public officials with the exception of those who are
incompetent or who knowingly and purposefully violate the law. 6 2
1.

The Two-Prong Testfor Determining Whether a FederalRight is
"Clearly Established"

It is inevitable that government officials will, in some cases,
reasonably but mistakenly, take action that is later found to be unlawful.
In these cases the officials who reasonably believed their actions were
lawful should not be held personally liable.6 3 Determining whether an
official acted reasonably, and thus would be entitled to qualified

54 Lukos v. Bettencourt, 23 F. Supp. 2d 175, 178 (D. Conn. 1998).
5s Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1997).
56 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
57 Id.
58 Id.

s9 Id.
6 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
61 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
62 Id. at 202 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S.
at 341).
63 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45).
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immunity, entails a two-step process.6 The first step is usually for the
court to determine whether the official's conduct violated a constitutional
right. 65 This inquiry establishes whether there is a wrong to be
addressed.6 6 The second step is for the court to determine whether the
right was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged incident; the
heart of the issue discussed in Marsh.7
The "clearly established" analysis is an objective standard to be
decided by the court as a matter of law. 68 To be "clearly established,"
the "contours of the right must be "sufficiently clear6 9 that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."70
The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
"clearly established" is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer
in a like situation that his or her conduct was unlawful. 7 ' Relatedly, in
the instant case it would be clear that a reasonable deputy prosecutor
such as Coulter, who is held to a higher ethical standard by way of his
profession, would have understood that keeping Phillip's photograph as a
personal memento (as opposed to contended issue of him giving it to the
press to vindicate himself in the eyes of the public) violated Marsh's
federal rights.
The "clearly established" inquiry requires that if the law did not put
the officer on notice that his or her conduct violated a federally protected
right of the plaintiff, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. 72
The Supreme Court has held that if reasonably competent officials would
have taken the challenged action or if they could disagree on the issue,
immunity should be recognized. 73 In cases where the factual record is
undisputed, as in Marsh, the courts should decide whether the
6 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
The court has discretion to reverse the order of these analytical steps, depending on the
circumstances of the particular case. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) ("On
reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there
is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts
and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.").
66Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2007).
6 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (9th
Cir. 2012).
6 Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Curley, 499 F.3d at 208-11.
69
See generally Weaver v. N.Y.C. Employees' Ret. Sys., 717 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(noting that the unlawfulness must be apparent in light of preexisting law).
70 Saucier,533 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added).
65 Id.

71 Id.
72 Id.

7 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986).
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government official "should have known he was acting unlawfully." 74 In
the instant case, Jay Coulter should have known he was acting
unlawfully when he kept and copied Phillip's postmortem photograph
and subsequently disseminated the photograph for his personal
vindication.75 However, the Marsh Court narrowly applied the "clearly
established" standard and mistakenly glossed over Coulter's
unreasonable and unlawful conduct. Thus, Coulter should not have been
immune from suit.
2.

Under Color of State Law

In addition to proving the existence of a "clearly established"
constitutional right, it must also be shown that a government official was
acting "under color of state law" at the time of the alleged violation.7 6
Purely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or unlawful, is
excluded under color of state law. 77 Additionally, former government
employee actions cannot give rise to an action without something more;
otherwise, the state could be held liable for the misconduct of all its
former employees.
II.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE HISTORICAL DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The heart of Marsh centers on the aforementioned standard of a
"clearly established" constitutionally protected right necessary to inform
officials of their unlawful conduct, and consequently the validity of the
official's qualified immunity status. In order to appropriately address
this issue, this Note will examine the due process protections of the
federal right to privacy under substantive due process and procedural due
process before addressing the Marsh Court's narrow application of a
"clearly established" analysis regarding the right to privacy over
postmortem images.

74Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
75Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012).
6 See Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).
7 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999).
78Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1158.
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THE ORIGINS OF FAMILIAL PRIVACY INTERESTS UNDER
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The Supreme Court has held that several types of freedoms that do
not appear in the plain text of the Constitution are nevertheless protected
by the Constitution under substantive due process, a principle that allows
federal courts to protect certain fundamental rights from government
interference under the authority of the Due Process Clause. 79 Preventing
postmortem images from becoming available to the general public is part
of the constitutional right of familial integrity and autonomy interests
under substantive due process. Relatedly, Marsh had a viable claim that
she had a federal right to control the autopsy photographs of her
deceased child, a right that exists (and has for some time) as a matter of
substantive due process and also as a state-created liberty interestso
protected by the constitutional procedural due process."
The Marsh
Court held that this right encompasses the most basic decisions about
family and parenthood,82 noting that the constitutional right to privacy
extends to family relationships,child rearing and education. 8 3 Certainly,
a parent's right to control a deceased child's body and postmortem
images encompasses matters relating to family relationships "flow[ing]
from the well-established substantive due process right to family
integrity." 84
In 2000, the same year that Coulter retired as a prosecutor for the
County of San Diego, the Supreme Court decided in Troxel v.
Granville85 that the interests of parents in the "care, custody, and control
of their children . .. is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests."86 The Court further noted that a parent's right to choose how
to care for a child reasonably extends to decisions dealing with death.87
Not only did Troxel's holding reemphasize the fundamental nature of

79See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Today, the Court
focuses on three types of rights under substantive due process in the Fourteenth Amendment that
were first identified Carolene Products' famous footnote 4. Those three types of rights are (1) the
rights enumerated in and derived from the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights, (2) the right
to participate in the political process, and (3) the rights of "discrete and insular minorities." Id.
so See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
8 Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152-53.
82California v. FCC, 75 F.3d 1350, 1361 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973).
83 Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1153.
8 Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
8 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
86 Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
8 Id.
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familial interests and parental responsibilities, it also provided sufficient
notice to government officials regarding the sanctity of the parent-child
dynamic.88 For over a decade, Troxel has stood for a parent's right to
control any remains or images of a deceased child from unwarranted
public exploitation, protected by the Constitution under substantive due
By photocopying and disseminating Phillip's autopsy
process. 89
photograph, Coulter unconscionably invaded Marsh's privacy, without
any reasonably legitimate governmental purpose, thereby violating her
substantive due process right. 90
B.

THE PRIVACY INTERESTS UNDER PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS CREATED BY STATE LAWS

A liberty interest may arise from an expectation or interest created
laws. 91 As a result, states may create liberty interests that are
state
by
protected under the Due Process Clause. 92 The Ninth Circuit has held
that a state official's failure to comply with state law that gives rise to a
liberty interest may amount to a procedural due process violation, which
can be vindicated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.93 The Ninth Circuit has
further held that state law can create a right protected by the Due Process
Clause only if the state law contains (1) substantive predicates governing
official decisions, and (2) explicitly mandatory language indicating the
outcome to be reached if the substantive grounds have been met. 9 4 To
meet the "substantive predicates" requirement, the state law must do
95
more than dictate procedure; it must protect some substantive end.
The purpose of Section 129 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure96 is to vindicate the deceased's family's right to privacy to
88Id.
8 Marsh, 680 F.3d at 154.
90
Id. at 1155.
9' Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
92Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).
See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 497-500 (9th Cir. 1997).
94 Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995).
95Id.
96At the time of the relevant events in Marsh, Section 129 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure provided in relevant part as follows:
[N]o copy, reproduction, or facsimile of any kind shall be made of any photograph, negative,
or print, including instant photographs and video tapes, of the body, or any portion of the
body, of a deceased person, taken by or for the coroner at the scene of death or in the course
of a post mortem examination or autopsy made by or caused to be made by the coroner,
except for use in a criminal action or proceeding in this state which relates to the death of that
person, or except as a court of this state permits, by order after good cause has been shown
and after written notification of the request for the court order has been served, at least five
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limit the reproduction of gruesome autopsy photographs, 9 7 and the
statute shows a clear intention to create a liberty interest in protecting the
death images of a family member. 9 8 Therefore, the statute provides a
liberty interest protected by the Constitution, satisfying the "substantive
predicates" and "mandatory language" requirements. 99
At the time of the relevant events in Marsh, section 129 contained
substantive limits on official discretion and provided that no copy of an
autopsy photograph could be taken except for use in criminal
proceedings or an action pertaining to the death of that individual,
satisfying the substantive criterion.100 The explicit and mandatory
language of Section 129 limited an official's discretion.101 For example,
the statute stated, "[N]o copy, reproduction, or facsimile of any kind
shall be made of any photograph ... [o]f a deceased person...."02
except with court approval or under specific exemptions.' 0 3 These
exceptions limited the protected liberty interest by allowing the use of
autopsy images in criminal trials relating to the decedent, with court
approval, or other valid reasons. 10 4
The Marsh Court found that California law regarding the
reproduction of photographs and other images taken in the course of
postmortem examination or autopsy created a right that the Due Process
Clause protects. 05 Its reasoning was based on the substantive limits of
an official's discretion contained in the law, in addition to its explicit and
mandatory language limiting the official's discretion.10 6 Under these due
process protections, Marsh had a "clearly established" right to privacy
over her son's postmortem images. This right was sufficiently grounded
in the "deeply rooted" history and traditions of our nation under
substantive due process, in addition to privacy interests created by state
laws under procedural due process.

days before the order is made, upon the district attorney of the county in which the post
mortem examination or autopsy has been made or caused to be made.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 129 (2009). The statute has since been amended; the most recent
amendment proscribes the dissemination as well as the making of a prohibited copy, reproduction, or
facsimile. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 129 (Westlaw 2014).
97 Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2012).
9
8Id. at 1155.
"Id. at 1156.
1
Id.
1
1Id.
102CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 129 (2009) (emphasis added).
103Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1156.
i04 Id.
Iosd.

106
Id.
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE ADOPTED A
BROADER ANALYTICAL APPROACH REGARDING A
PARENT'S "CLEARLY ESTABLISHED"
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO PRIVACY
OVER HIS OR HER CHILD'S DEATH IMAGES
Despite finding that Brenda Marsh had a federal privacy right to
control the dissemination of her two-year-old son's autopsy photo, the
Ninth Circuit stopped short of entirely deciding in her favor.'0 7 Rather,
the court unanimously ruled that a former government official who
distributed the autopsy photo to the media could not be held liable
Thus, the former
because the law was not "clearly established."' 0
prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity in Marsh's § 1983
action.1 09 Although Section 129 was enacted prior to the conduct at
issue, the Ninth Circuit said it previously had not been clear that the
statute created a federally protected right to privacy interest in death
images, and the prosecutor was not required to anticipate the court's
ruling."10
Instead, the court should have focused on whether a
reasonable deputy prosecutor such as Coulter would have understood
that keeping the photograph as a personal memento (as opposed to him
giving it to the press to vindicate himself in the eyes of the public)
violated Marsh's federal rights.'
A.

COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED A LONGSTANDING FEDERAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY SURROUNDING THE DISSEMINATION
OF FAMILIAL POSTMORTEM IMAGES SUFFICIENT TO
SHOW THE RIGHT WAS "CLEARLY ESTABLISHED"

Case law and "deeply rooted" traditions demonstrate that the
familial right to control the disposition of a deceased family member's
body and images is "clearly established" as a constitutional privacy
right.11 2 Over a century ago, in Schuyler v. Curtis, " the New York
Court of Appeals held that surviving relatives of the deceased are entitled

07

1 Id. at 1148.
0
1 Id. at 1160.
09

1 Id. at 1148.

110Id. at
III Id. at

1159.
1158-59.
112Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998); McCambridge v. Little Rock, 766
S.W.2d 909 (Ark. 1989); Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930) (per curiam).
113Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895).
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to the privilege of protecting the deceased's memory.11 4 The plaintiffs
chief reason for bringing the action was to establish and maintain a
principle that the right to privacy should be respected."
The Schuyler Court noted that the right to privacy of the living, not
the dead, may be violated by improperly interfering with the character or
memory of a deceased relative.11 6 The court further reasoned that this
privilege exists for the benefit of the living and is bestowed on the
surviving relatives to protect the family's feelings and "prevent a
violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the
deceased."" 7 The age-old, powerful privilege discussed in Schuyler
highlights the intangible familial privacy interests tethered to substantive
due process, perfectly aligning with the constitutional right at issue in
Marsh, which the Ninth Circuit did not thoroughly apply.
B.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN NARROWLY RESTRICTING
FA VISHAS SOLELY APPLICABLE TO THE FOIA CONTEXT

Plaintiff Brenda Marsh claimed that the familial right to control
postmortem images of family members was "clearly established,"
notably relying on National Archives and Records Administration v.
Favish."8 Favish, an attorney, invoked the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) in seeking public disclosure of death-scene photographs of
former Deputy White House Counsel, Vincent W. Foster, Jr.1 9 The
Supreme Court ruled against the government in part, though it did
acknowledge that Foster's family had a privacy interest that should be
recognized by the law.' 2 0 The Favish Court ruled that the government
properly withheld death-scene photographs from the media and public
exploitation, on the basis of FOIA Exemption 7(C), which exempts the
disclosure of materials that could, if released, cause an "unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy."' 2 1 The Court also held that Exemption
7(C) "requires us to protect, in the proper degree, the personal privacy of
citizens against the uncontrolled release of information compiled through
the power of the state." 2 2
114Id. at 25.

11sId.
116Id.
117Id.
118See generally Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157
(2004).
"1 Id.
0

12 Id. at 159.
121Id. at 157.
22

1 Id. at 172.
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The Favish Court highlighted the aforementioned "well-established
cultural tradition acknowledging a family's control over the body and
death images of the deceased." 23 Yet, the Marsh Court found Favish
insufficient to "clearly establish" a federal right to control the
dissemination of postmortem images noting that Favish was decided in
the FOIA context, and a reasonable officer would not have been on
notice that the right applies outside the statutory context, as a separate
constitutional right.12 4 Rather than prematurely limiting Favish as solely
pertaining to the FOIA,125 the Ninth Circuit should have applied its
broader holding emphasizing that surviving family members have a right
to control the disposition of a deceased's body, and to "limit attempts to
exploit pictures of the deceased's remains for public purposes."l26
Although Favish centers on the FOIA exception, its holding
ultimately stands for a broader, fundamental protection of privacy. In
making this right clear, the Supreme Court recognized the very principle
in Schuyler noting that a privacy right belongs, not to the deceased, but
to the survivors as "to prevent a violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased." 2 7 The longstanding principles
recognized in Favish, dating over a century to Schuyler, show that a
"clearly established" right to privacy existed, as Marsh rightfully argued,
when Coulter unlawfully disseminated Phillip's postmortem
photographs. Based on these time-honored principles, the Marsh Court
should have broadly applied the traditional notions of familial privacy
rights, as the Supreme Court extensively discussed in Favish.
1.

Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Favish Affirms the Broader
LongstandingPrinciplesof FamilialPrivacyand Control Relating
to Postmortem Images

Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court and wrote that the lower courts (including the Ninth Circuit that
heard Favish on appeal) distorted the rationales of privacy protection.128
Justice Kennedy made it abundantly clear that "the concept of personal
privacy under Exemption 7(C) is not some limited or 'cramped notion'

123Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d I148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nat'l Archives
& Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004)).
24

1 Id. at 1158-59.
125Id. at 1159.

126Favish, 541 U.S. at 167 (emphasis added).
127Id. at 168-69 (quoting Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895)); see supra note 117.
128Favish, 541 U.S. at 165.
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of that idea."1 2 9 Instead, he declared, Exemption 7(C) is broad enough
to protect surviving families' own privacy rights against public intrusions
long deemed impermissible under the common law and in our cultural
traditions.' 3 0 To emphasize this longstanding principle, Justice Kennedy
pointed to our "well-established cultural tradition" of respecting deathscene images, and in particular, a family's control over them throughout
history. 131
Justice Kennedy sternly noted, echoing Schuyler, that the right to
personal privacy is "not confined" to the deceased but also includes the
deceased's family.1 32 He also made it clear that the Court recognized the
survivor privacy principle.' 33 The principle was applied based upon the
family's own right and interest in personal privacy protection.' 34 He
characterized this interest as the privacy interest of the family members
"to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their
own peace of mind and tranquility." 35 Understanding the depth of
Justice Kennedy's reasoning, the Marsh Court should have broadly
applied the "well-established" traditions explicitly acknowledged in
Favish.
2.

CongressionalIntent Supports FamilialPrivacyRights Related to
Postmortem Images

The Favish Court opined that Congress intended to allow the
assertion of familial privacy rights against public intrusions related to the
death of loved ones.13 6 The Court found it "inconceivable that Congress
could have intended a definition of 'personal privacy' so narrow that it
would allow [these materials to be obtained] without limitations at the
expense of surviving family members' personal privacy."'l37 Justice
Kennedy further noted that Congress "legislated against this
background" in crafting Exemption 7(C) as a FOIA amendment.13 8
Accordingly, the Court held that the FOIA "recognizes surviving family

129Id.

(emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of

the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989)).
13 0 Id. at 167.
131 Id. at 168.
32
1 Id. at 165.
33
1 Id. at 167.
34
1 Id. at 166.
1 Id.
136Id.
1 Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
13 id. at 169.
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members' right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative's
death-scene images."'39 Moreover, the Court was stem in upholding
fundamental privacy interests of surviving family members, inside the
scope the FOIA with broad implications to be applied outside the FOIA.
Not only did the Supreme Court's decision in Favish reverse the
Ninth Circuit's erroneous holding on appeal, it also encompassed a broad
range of privacy protections to guide future privacy decisionmaking
while preserving valuable "well-established" privacy interests, as the
Ninth Circuit should have done in Marsh. As a matter of practicality, a
distinct principle drawn from this landmark decision is that the disclosure
of particularly sensitive personal information pertaining to a deceased
person infringes the longstanding federal privacy interests of surviving
family members. Accordingly, the proper application of Favish calls for
the protection of a decedent's family from the reasonably expected harm
of public disclosure.' 40 Favish provides a solid foundation for this
venerable "well established" right to privacy pertaining to a family
member's death images, and if applied broadly, could have served well
in Marsh.
IV. THE MARSH COURT'S NARROW APPLICATION OF A
"CLEARLY ESTABLISHED" RIGHT IN FA VISHCOMPELLED
IT TO ERRONEOUSLY GRANT A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Viewing Favish in a narrow context limited to the FOIA, Marsh
overlooked the broad precedent and principles pertaining to the
constitutional right to privacy of a deceased family member's
photographs. The court reasoned that Favish was decided after Coulter
retired (but before he distributed the autopsy photographs) and therefore
Coulter could not be held accountable for violating Marsh's right to
privacy.141 The court further noted that the constitutional right at issue
was not "clearly established" before the Favish ruling, thus entitling
Coulter to qualified immunity. 142
A public official can be held liable under § 1983 only if the
contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right.14 3

39

1 Id. at 170.
140Id. at

167.

141Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012).
42

1 Id. at 1159.
143See

supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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Based on "well established" traditions and precedent sufficiently holding
that such a familial privacy right has existed from time immemorial, a
reasonable official in a similar situation such as Coulter would have
known his conduct would violate a longstanding and "clearly
established" right.
Had the Marsh Court adopted a broader approach in finding a
"clearly established" right outlawing Coulter's unreasonable conduct, the
constitutional right at issue could have been appropriately addressed.
After all, the court based its ruling on the same "deeply rooted" traditions
relating to familial privacy interests under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, yet ultimately failed to stretch its analysis to
conform with our nation's "well-established" history and traditions. 14 4
Applying the aforementioned standards to the instant case, Coulter
should not have succeeded with a qualified immunity defense.
CONCLUSION
Favish recognizes on our nation's "deeply rooted" history and
traditions regarding familial privacy interests under substantive due
process. A broad application of these longstanding principles that have
been continuously affirmed in Supreme Court precedent highlight a
"clearly established" right to inform Coulter, a government official, that
his conduct was unlawful. Consequently, the Marsh Court should have
applied a similarly rigorous application of Favish, albeit in a broader
context, encompassing the longstanding traditions of surviving family
members' right to control deceased family member's photographs.
Therefore, Coulter violated Marsh's constitutionally protected right to
privacy because the right was "clearly established" when Coulter
photocopied and disseminated Phillip Marsh's postmortem photographs
for all the wrong reasons.

4

Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154.
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